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The Bifurcation of the Two Worlds: Assessing the Gap Between 
Internationals and Locals in State-Building Processes 
 
Abstract: More and more studies highlight the limits of state-building conducted ‘from 
the top-down’. Building on the literature on the subject and using a Rosenauian concept 
in a novel way, this article posits that international interventions tend to create a 
‘bifurcation of the two worlds’. Departing from a study of Kosovo and Timor-Leste, the 
article posits that the massive arrival of staff involved in international governance will 
create a social gap between the international and the local ‘worlds’, which will in turn 
fuel local resistance as this gap will become target of narratives of resistance by certain 
local actors. This bifurcation is exemplified by the ‘white car syndrome’, a concept 
representing the horde of white UN vehicles accompanying major interventions and 
developed in this contribution. Thus, this article attempts to shed a new light on the 
legitimacy crises that Kosovo and Timor-Leste experienced at the beginning of the 
current century, while increasing the linkages between development studies and peace 
studies. 
 
Forthcoming in Third World Quarterly 32(10) 
 
Introduction 
There is an emerging trend in the literature on state-building that identifies the significant 
limits of state-building when unrelated to the needs and perceptions of the local society 
targeted by the intervention. External actors necessarily affect the socio-political 
processes of the target state. It is not the case that nation-building implies interference 
while state-building focused on institutions does not; no matter how one defines the 
terms, an international intervention necessarily implies a degree of interference. In that 
regard and as I have argued elsewhere, the common cliché saying that it is possible to 
undertake state-building activities without embarking in nation-building appears 
misguided.i In that context, as Chiuyuki Aoi, Cedric de Coning and Ramesh Thakur have 
highlighted in their work, international interventions do not generate only positive and 
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beneficial outcomes – they can have negative consequences, even if most of the time 
unintended.ii This new research direction in the study of international interventions is also 
reflected by the burgeoning literature on the critique of liberal peaceiii and by new trends 
in the study of humanitarianism.iv  
 
Various studies have highlighted the limits of top-down approaches, especially in the 
context of Kosovo and Timor-Leste.v This present contribution will build from this 
existing work and contribute to the understanding of the legitimacy gap between 
international interveners on the one hand and segments of local population and local 
actors on the other. The massive arrival of staff involved in international governance will 
create a social gap between the international and the local ‘worlds’, which will in turn 
fuel local resistance as this gap will become target of narratives of resistance by certain 
local actors. This article posits that we could understand and use one of James Rosenau’ 
seminal contributions – the bifurcation of the two worlds – in a novel way in the context 
of international interventions. Building on the literature of the subject, one could argue 
that direct governance of war-torn territories is hardly compatible with the objective of 
fostering and nurturing legitimacy in an externally-led state-building project. In that 
regard, the ‘political’ and ‘social’ worlds seem far apart – the political response, namely 
direct governance, seems unfit to adequately address the social challenges of postwar 
state-building. However, more than just an academic metaphor, the ‘bifurcation of the 
two worlds’ can be understood as a practical assessment of the situation in Kosovo and 
Timor-Leste. The difference in the living standards between the ‘internationals’ and the 
‘locals’, as well as the ‘white car syndrome’, a concept developed in this contribution, 
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will come to exemplify concretely the exogenous character of the international missions. 
As observed and analysed under the United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo 
(UNMIK; from 1999) and the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor 
(UNTAET; 1999-2002), local actors will tap into the discontent to mobilize sections of 
the local population against the United Nations, in a scenario that appeared unlikely back 
in 1999 when the UN benefited from high levels of local support in Kosovo or in Timor-
Leste.  
 
This article takes the stance that perception is in itself a major factor of legitimacy and 
legitimization. As Ian Hurd states, ‘legitimacy refers to the normative belief by an actor 
that a rule or institution ought to be obeyed. It is a subjective quality, relational between 
actor and institution, and defined by the actor’s perception of the institution’.vi The limits 
of top-down state-building interventions in terms of building legitimacy on the ground 
has already been analyzed by many scholars. However, departing from Hurd’s definition 
of legitimacy, this article explores the narratives of resistance to the international 
interventions in Kosovo and Timor-Leste, hinting at the paradox of statebuilders being 
deliberately and firmly isolated yet highly visible at the same time. In that regard, one has 
to agree with Orford that most internationalist accounts of post-conflict reconstruction 
too often serve to obscure the power relations that intervention produces, and the 
exploitation that it enables, hereby silencing these voices of contestation.vii This 
contribution furthers this research agenda by providing a specific analysis of the local 
resistance experienced in Kosovo and Timor-Leste, while building bridges with other 
case studies such as Afghanistan, Cambodia or Namibia. 
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The ‘more is better’ approach and its implications 
There is a general consensus, in both policy and academia, that reconstruction of the 
sovereign state is necessary and that state collapse necessitates external assistance in a 
transitional period. In the exception, one could find a certain number of academics who 
defend the idea that societies experiencing major crises should be allowed a ‘fresh start’. 
For instance, Andreas Mehler and Claude Ribaux state that ‘the collapse of states in crisis 
need not be prevented, since a ‘better state’ cannot emerge until that collapse has taken 
place.’ Similarly, for Samuel Eisenstadt, ‘collapse, far from being an anomaly, both in the 
real world and in social evolutionary theory, presents in dramatic form not the end of 
social institutions, but almost always the beginning of new ones.’ Timothy Raeymaekers 
also argues that “we should start thinking hard about the possibility that state collapse 
presents a plausible, and perhaps even likely, outcome for some states in the system.’viii 
However, the opinion of William Zartman is more reflective of the current consensus on 
state-building issues: ‘it is necessary to provide a large, informally representative forum, 
and if the contenders for power do not do so, an external force to guarantee security and 
free expression during the legitimization process may be required. […] In all three areas 
– power, participation, and resources – it is hard to get around the usefulness, if not the 
outright need, of external assistance’.ix The exact nature of this external assistance is 
nevertheless widely debated.  
 
A certain trend has been emerging in the 1990s, leading to a prescription that ‘more is 
better’ in terms of state-building, where ‘the more intrusive the intervention, the more 
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successful the outcome’.x It is an assessment supported generally by a military 
perspective of state-building issues. For instance, Zachary Selden of the US Army 
College writes that ‘in short, more is better; this equation underscores the need to have 
reserves of deployable personnel capable of spanning the spectrum between “hard” and 
“soft” capabilities’.xi The ‘more is better’ perspective also echoes the Powell or 
Weinberger doctrine, which states that every resource and tool should be used to achieve 
decisive force against the enemy, minimizing US casualties and ending the conflict 
quickly by forcing the weaker force to capitulate. It also presents interesting parallels 
with the Clausewitzian logic, for which war is an act of force, the application of which 
knows no logical limit by virtue of its escalatory dynamics. 
 
One of the best examples of the ‘more is better’ framework is the widely-quoted RAND 
study on US-led state-building operations, directed by James Dobbins et al.. The study 
identifies five case studies (Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan), and 
contrasts these with the historic cases of Germany and Japan, that have according to them 
‘set a standard for post-conflict nation-building that has not since been equalled’. Their 
conclusion is that a high level of economic assistance and high numbers of troops 
deployed for a long time were crucial for the success of the two historic operations and 
can explain why recent operations showed little success: ‘the higher level of input 
accounts in significant measure for the higher level of output measured in the 
development of democratic institutions and economic growth’.xii Needless to say, the 
authors do not seem to acknowledge the sharp contextual differences existing between 
the cases, varying across nearly fifty years and taking place in substantially different 
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international context. Actually, it seems to be the case with various studies taking Japan 
and Germany as a yardstick to compare other state-building ventures. According to Jan-
Werner Müller, ‘analogical reasoning is likely to have poor results for reasons rooted in 
cognitive psychology’. Analogies reduce the complexity of the situation at-hand for a 
decision-maker and analogies also serve to create a sense of ‘instant legitimacy’ for the 
policy prescriptions advocated. Yuen Foong Khong concurs, arguing that American 
policy-makers all too often rely on faulty, simplified historical analogies to justify 
commonalities that simply do not exist.xiii 
 
Moreover, the most recent study made by Dobbins et al., this time on UN’s role in 
nation-building and meant to complement their previous study, goes along the same lines. 
While the authors recognize that the UN has shown, mutatis mutandis, better results with 
a ‘light-footprint’ approach, they wrote that ‘the United States would be well advised to 
leave the small footprint, low profile approach to the United Nations, and resume 
supersizing its nation-building missions’. This prescription echoes Steven Ratner’s 
remarks, when he said that ‘interveners ought to err on the side of more rather than less 
even though the empirical evidence to date does not obviously support a more is better 
perspective’.xiv  
 
Assessing specific turbulences in state building processes 
As this article previously stated, the nature of external interventions, be they more or less 
massive in human or economic terms, will invariably have effects on state-building. 
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Massive international interventions, going along the lines of ‘more is better’ will impact 
the local state-building process, in ways sometimes unforeseen by the interveners, 
generating resistance. To use Rosenauian concepts in my own words, I argue that the 
‘bifurcation of two worlds’, led to specific ‘turbulences’ in Kosovo and Timor-Leste.xv I 
do not refer to the ‘two worlds’ here in terms of the multi-centered and state-centered, 
which is the crux of Rosenau’s contribution, but rather in terms of ‘political’ and ‘social’ 
spheres. Hence, the political response, namely direct governance, seems unfit to correctly 
address the social challenges of postwar state-building. In other words, the idea of direct 
governance of a territory, at least in its contemporary form in Kosovo or in Timor-Leste, 
is hardly compatible with the objective of fostering and nurturing legitimacy in an 
externally-led state-building project. The direct governance by an international 
administration contributes to exacerbating ‘asocial forms of alienation’ in the words of 
Chopra and Hohe, or, to use a Durkheimian concept, contributes to specific forms of 
anomie, understood as a breakdown in moral norms, which ‘springs from the lack of 
collective forces at certain points in society’.xvi 
 
In the context of prolonged administration, it is difficult for external actors to avoid the 
social backlash inherent to the exercise of authority. As Jane Stromseth, David Wippman 
and Rosa Brooks assert, ‘there is no honor for domestic populations in being the object of 
an intervention. Local gratitude can be quickly vitiated by a sense of humiliation or 
disappointed expectations’.xvii Lacking the social bond necessary to instil a relationship 
of trust between a given government and its citizens, international rule is almost certain 
to be resented by the local population and to be seen as a blow to their dignity. David 
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Harland, head of the United Nations Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit and who served as 
Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General for UNTAET, notes that ‘all 
international administration, however benign, is to some extent illegitimate. International 
administration, even when it is aligned with the wishes of the people concerned, is almost 
always imposed from outside’. He continues: ‘fundamental political illegitimacy of an 
administration mandated from the outside poses some unique problems, with which the 
UN continues to wrestle’.xviii  
 
It is interesting to note that some authors prefer to simply avoid this issue, delegitimizing 
the concepts of protectorate or trusteeship in a UN context. For instance, Bothe and 
Marauhn state that ‘the concepts of occupation, protectorate and trusteeship as such are 
ideologically still linked to particular political and historical situations, related to 
traditional armed conflicts or to colonialism. Simply referring to or relying upon these 
concepts may give rise to fears that the UN provides a forum for a new form of 
“benevolent colonialism”’.xix However, as mentioned earlier, what is important here is 
not the substance of the claims, or to judge if these claims are objectively grounded, but 
the fact that they are voiced by segments of the local population and, as such, are an 
expression of a political reality experienced by international administrations. In that 
regard, these discursive politics have to be included in the analysis, as a symptom of 
social anomie created by the outside intervention. These claims might be ‘exaggerated by 
local actors’, as claimed by Deputy International Administrator for Kosovo, Charles 
Brayshaw, or ‘only partially justified’, as noted by Deputy International Administrator 
for Timor-Leste, Jean-Christophe Cady.xx However, as Bain states,  
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It is not enough to call trusteeship by another name in order to escape the 
opprobrium if this ugliness. It is not enough to merely assert a preference for 
human rights or some other value in order to embrace trusteeship while avoiding 
the stigma of empire. Nor it is enough to ground trusteeship in the universal 
claims of human rights in order to seek immunization from the reproach that 
often attaches to anti-paternal critiques.xxi 
 
Bifurcation of the two worlds 
More than an academic metaphor, one could also argue that the ‘bifurcation of the two 
worlds’ can be understood as a practical assessment of the situation in Kosovo and 
Timor-Leste, depicting the gap between the ‘international’ and ‘local’ way of life. This 
process of differentiation will come to be resented from the local population and seen as 
embodying the exogenous character of the international presence and state-building 
agenda when instrumentalized by local actors. It is a phenomenon that goes beyond the 
strict organizational distinction and does not restrict itself to the UN in a context of 
international administration. Similarly, this ‘gap’ between the local and international way 
of living is not specific to Kosovo or Timor-Leste and is presents in almost all peace 
missions with sizeable international component. 
 
For instance in Cambodia under UNTAC, a ‘dual economy’ created by the international 
intervention was also noticeable. As noted by Julio Jeldres, ‘the arrival of the UN mission 
created a false economy centered around hotels, shopping centers, restaurants, and bars 
that Cambodians cannot afford’. There was an ‘enormous disparity between the salaries 
that the UN paid to its Cambodian employees and those of their non-Cambodian 
colleagues’, a policy that ‘aroused anti-UN feeling’.xxii UNTAC international officials 
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were paid a per diem of US$145 while the average annual income at this time was 
approximately US$160. Land values, rents, and the prices of services and utilities soared, 
with no commensurate increase in government wages. The price of gas and pork doubled 
because of the high UN salaries. As Shawcross recalls, ‘as a result, a double economy 
quickly developed and a large proportion of civil servants left their desks in order to 
profit from the private sector boom. In Phnom Penh inflation, corruption, and nepotism 
became ever more pervasive’.xxiii
xxvii
 The UNTAC mission was also infamous for its impact 
on prostitution in Cambodia. Estimates put the number of pre-UNTAC sex workers at 
around 6,000, which then increased to 20,000,xxiv with a tenfold increase in the number of 
blood donors testing HIV-positive in the same period.xxv The prostitution scandals 
certainly affected the image of the mission, especially given the pale response provided 
by the UN establishment. Yasushi Akashi, Special Representative of the UN Secretary 
General reportedly answered ‘boys will be boys’ when confronted in a press 
conference.xxvi In this context, the acronym ‘UNTAC’ was quickly ridiculed as ‘UN 
Transmission of AIDS to Cambodians’.  As Steve Heder and Judy Ledgerwood, from 
the UNTAC Information Division, recognize: 
UNTAC was seen as one more occupying army, one more distant, aloof, 
uncaring, and potentially dangerous authority to be outwardly subservient to, just 
to be on the safe side. As stories of outrageous acts by individual ill-disciplined 
soldiers piled up and were told and retold, UNTAC was also seen with horror as a 
horde of drinking, whoring, half-naked drivers who ran over people and couldn’t 
care less.xxviii 
For David Roberts, a long-time expert of Cambodia, the mission brought societal tensions 
that took a heavy toll on the Cambodian social fabric. He even argues that ‘when a 
“culture of violence” took greater root [in Cambodia], it was as much a function of the 
tensions UNTAC’s arrival caused, as it was the legacy of Pol Pot, or of the continuity in 
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the arbitrary violence of the 1960s’.
xxxii
xxix It was a process that was candidly recognized by a 
UN report examining the after-effects of UNTAC, stating: ‘what is particularly disturbing 
is that this pattern of intervention may have served to transform the Cambodian economy 
and society in such a way as to distort or undermine the development process for many 
years to come’.xxx This contradicts the generally optimistic assessments of UN’s role in 
Cambodia, made by the UN itselfxxxi or by scholars.  
 
Hence, for Steele, ‘every UN mission is plagued by a daily sense of financial and social 
apartheid between expatriate officials and local people (…) complaints about a “them” 
and “us” culture in UN missions are commonplace’.xxxiii
xxxiv
 It is also a general trend 
identified by Ghani and Lockhart when discussing the distinction between international 
and local bureaucracies. For them, offices of international organizations and NGOs 
display all the ‘signs that mark them as places of privilege’. ‘Although physically present 
in Africa, Latin America, or Asia, mentally most of the bureaucrats working in these 
buildings remain firmly back in the developed world’. They add: ‘though living in the 
same country, the two bureaucracies – one international and well-funded from abroad, 
one national and almost always starved for funds – are conceptually miles apart and 
therefore rarely interact meaningfully’. The result is a bifurcation of the two worlds, 
where ‘foreign officials gravitate toward each other socially as well through their clubs 
and other groups, thus creating segregated spaces of interaction’.  
 
However, this feature of the international life tends to take a very specific political 
expression as the authority exerted by the international mission increases and takes the 
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shape of an international administration. In fact, politicized by local actors, these issues 
tend to take a whole new meaning, targeting the exogenous character of the state-building 
agenda conducted by the international administrators.   
  
In Timor-Leste, this ‘bifurcation of the two worlds’ has been exemplified mainly by two 
issues: the accommodation of UN officials in the early time of the mission on floating 
hotels chartered for the occasion, and the establishment of the UNTAET headquarters in 
the Governor’s hotel, which has been formerly occupied by the Indonesian administrator. 
These two policies sent unfortunate signals to the local population, and were quickly seen 
as ‘a constant reminder to the people of Dili that their long experience of being ruled by a 
privileged class was not yet over’.
xxxvi
xxxvii
xxxv One National Council of Timorese Resistance 
(CNRT) official states that ‘I think it is very obvious that East Timorese are becoming 
more and more marginalised. It is almost as though an elite world has been created by the 
UN expatriate community’.  In that context, the local frustration and resentment have 
been further exacerbated by the difference in living conditions: ‘Dili today does not 
present a pretty picture, with a separate expatriate world superimposed on a scene of 
destruction and poverty. The foreigners are rich, with cars, offices, hot running water, 
Sunday barbecues. The East Timorese have almost nothing’.  For a local 
commentator, ‘The contrasting incomes and lifestyles between the expatriates and 
nationals in Timor-Leste, particularly in Dili, has caused deep envy and anger among the 
local population.’ He goes on to say ‘that’s why rock attacks still happen occasionally, 
even if the war has ended. Those rocks are being thrown at UNTAET cars during night 
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time, smashing window screens. This outpouring of anger is triggered by the flagrant 
display of wealth amidst the widespread poverty around the local people’.xxxviii  
 
One of the first political acts of de Mello as international administrator was to charter 
boats in order to accommodate UN personnel in the first phase of the deployment.xxxix 
While it was a practical way of providing secure accommodation in those first difficult 
months, the fact that these ships were restricted to internationals created a commotion in 
the Timorese society. It quickly became the supreme expression of the social distinction, 
physically and socially, between the international and local worlds. As noted by Chopra, 
in the context of UNTAET, ‘comparisons with colonial administrations became 
unavoidable, and affirmed by various forms of segregation between expatriates and the 
Timorese’. Timorese were turned into the servants of foreigners in their own land, since 
they could apply only for menial jobs. Physically, the UN’s hermetic office world was 
increasingly disconnected from life on the streets. Floating container hotels restricted the 
access of Timorese, except to serve drinks and food.xl Another account of the floating 
hotel comes from an aid worker around the same time: ‘that night on the way home from 
work, I pass a ship the size of an oil tanker, dwarfing the palm trees. It is the UN hotel. 
International staff serve, manage and cook. Food comes from Singapore and Australia. It 
serves 600 guests, paying AS$ 150 a night. Not a cent gets into the local economy’.xli 
 
The social distinction induced by the ‘floating hotels’ was as much a matter of perception 
as objective reality. As noted by Power, ‘the floating hotels were not grand – the ships 
were really nothing more than barges topped with four layers of stacked containers – but 
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from the vantage point of the Timorese onshore, the ships looked like luxury liners, 
especially after a rooftop disco opened on one’. Reverend Max Surjadinata after a trip to 
Timor-Leste in April 2000 concurs: ‘on the waterfront downtown, there is a huge 
monstrosity called Hotel Olympia, an edifice constructed from container boxes put on top 
of each other’. Jose Ramos-Horta even called the new businessmen in Timor-Leste the 
‘carpetbaggers’, saying ‘they are building air-conditioned shipping containers - calling 
them hotels - and charging more than $100 for the privilege’.xlii 
 
The issue that Timorese nationals were initially barred from dining or sleeping on the 
ships further stirred unrest. In the first demonstration against the UN presence in January 
2000, protestors held posters declaring ‘East Timorese need food and medicine, not 
hotels and discotheques’.xliii As noted by Jake Jacobson, a US liaison officer in Dili, ‘you 
see the Olympia [floating hotel] and all the Land Rovers lined up outside, and you know 
you’re seeing the symbol of the foreign invasion and the gap between the haves and the 
have-nots. The East Timorese know that too. It’s bound to cause resentment at some 
point’.xliv The ships would become such a headache for the Special Representative of the 
Secretary-General (SRSG) that he finally decided to limit the club’s hours in July 2000 
because of some recent ‘incidents involving UNTAET personnel and local persons’.xlv In 
his letter, de Mello reminded international personnel that the United Nations requires 
them ‘at all times to maintain the highest standards of integrity and conduct’. According 
to Power, by then, the damage had long been done. The chartering of the boats was most 
probably well intentioned; the UN deciding it should not compete for the sparse useable 
housing remaining in Dili. However, on the other side, many Timorese have argued that 
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the UN should have launched a crash programme to help local families accommodate 
international staff by funding immediate refurbishing and renovation, rather than 
providing lucrative contracts to international corporations.xlvi  
 
The second event that increased the perception of a gap between ‘internationals’ and 
‘locals’ happened in 2000, when the UN decided to move its headquarters to the 
Governor’s House, a two-story colonnaded mansion which had previously housed the 
Portuguese and the Indonesian colonial powers.xlvii
xlviii
 The same argument can be made here, 
concerning the inherent difficulty of finding accommodations big enough for the UN 
administration in a country where most of the infrastructure was destroyed. Furthermore, 
Chesterman sees the installation in the Governor’s hotel and the rentals of floating hotels 
as demonstrations of the transitional nature of the mission.  However, certain political 
actors resented these decisions, as will be discussed below.   
 
Furthermore, this political evolution has to be put into the wider context of the cultural 
upheavals created by the arrival of foreigners in a very traditional Timor-Leste, where the 
Church is a powerful and revered institution.xlix The differences of ways of life between 
internationals and locals are stark. As Murdoch reports: 
many [expatriate] women are scantily clad, a few even go topless at more 
secluded areas, while closer to town, along a winding track littered with beer 
cans, Timorese women swim at another beach wearing long sleeved shirts and 
shorts. The arrival of almost 10,000 UN peacekeepers and UN personnel in East 
Timor after last year's violence and destruction has raised concerns about a clash 
of cultures in the staunchly Catholic territory and is fuelling anti-foreign 
sentiments among Timorese.l  
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Yet another interesting representation of this cultural divide happens when a crocodile 
was seen on 30 August 2001 in a tidal canal near the Turismo hotel in Dili, a place 
widely frequented by internationals. The crocodile is seen as a holy animal in Timor-
Leste, with the popular myth being that an old crocodile became the island of Timor, a 
clear reference to the geographical shape of the territory and its rugged terrain. Some 
Timorese thought that ‘the crocodile wanted to guard Timorese culture and protect it 
from loose foreign morals. Women had offended Christ by bathing under the gaze of his 
giant statue in skimpy bikinis, or even naked, at Areia Branca, which had become a 
popular weekend haunt for foreigners’.li  
 
Furthermore, if UNTAET managed to avoid growth of the prostitution and pornography 
industries seen under UNTAC, it was nevertheless still an issue in Timor-Leste.lii In 
November 2000, angry youths in Dili threw stones at UN police officers after a mob of 
3,000 peoples chased four alleged prostitutes.liii Irena Cristalis recalls that ‘prostitution 
and HIV/AIDS followed in their wake [UN officials], as did pornography, which small 
boys peddled on DVDs in front of ‘Hello Mister,’ the first supermarket to open’.liv 
Bishop Bello also took the issues of prostitution and AIDS in a speech, accusing 
foreigners of corrupting Timor-Leste. President Joao Gusmão also complained that 
‘currently the Old Market is a decadent place showing signs of moral decadence where 
freedom is often mistaken with anarchy’.lv It might not be a coincidence that among the 
businesses ransacked in 2002, in one of the most violent incidents after 1999, was the 
Australian-owned ‘Hello Mister’ supermarket, which specializes in supplying imported 
goods to UN and other foreign workers. The mob ‘attack[ed] specific targets, beginning 
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with the parliament and the Hello Mister store, and expanding to a few other foreign-
owned stores’.lvi Indeed, the supermarket is one of ‘myriad signs of the gaping social 
distance that has emerged between locals and foreign officials’.lvii  
 
The impacts of the international presence, exemplified by the chartering of floating hotels 
or the increase in prostitution, were quickly resented by the local population and the local 
elite. With the UN firmly entrenched in Timor-Leste by the year 2000, and with the 
progressive building up of the state-building architecture, Timorese gradually felt 
excluded from the governance process. Gusmão directly addressed the issue in his speech 
on New Year’s Eve of 2001, stressing ‘we are witnessing another phenomenon in East 
Timor; that of an obsessive acculturation to standards that hundreds of international 
experts try to convey to East Timorese’. He added that ‘we do not call for a hasty 
transition period, an inadequate one “à la Cambodia” where the international staff left a 
vacuum behind after leaving’, he said. ‘For this reason, we defend a clearly phased 
strategy for the political process. Rather than considering the success it may be for the 
UN we are concentrated on a process that may bring success to the suffering people of 
East Timor’.lviii For Chesterman, it sounded like the “Asian values” argument in the 
1990s, when South-East Asian leaders were defending their authoritarian regimes against 
the exportation of norms from the West;lix however, it can also arguably be understood as 
a local reaction to the international presence, which had already suffered considerable 
decline in legitimacy. In fact, it is quite telling that Gusmão integrates Cambodia 
references in his speech, having been himself warned by Hun Sen about UN politics and 
impacts on countries in 1999. Hun Sen admittedly said to Gusmão and Ramos-Horta that 
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‘the UN will come with their white cars and their high salaries, and they will run around 
busily for two or three years. Then their mandate will expire, they will leave, and you 
will be left with almost nothing’.lx After that, Gusmão and Ramos-Horta in their first 
meeting with Vieira de Mello asked the later to promise that the UN will not run Timor 
like it ran Cambodia. ‘We don’t want you to come and go and for us to be left shaking 
our heads and saying, was that a storm that just passed through here’? Vieira de Mello 
agreed and promised: ‘we will not repeat Cambodia here’.lxi However, the New Year 
speech by Gusmão seemed to refer to this discussion with Vieira de Mello, expressing 
more than anything else the Timorese discontent with the nature of the state-building 
agenda conducted by the UN in Timor-Leste. 
 
Recognizing the nature of the problem, the UN decided to adopt a new policy of reducing 
its peacekeeping force in April 2000. Fabrizio Hochschild, special assistant to the UN 
Special Representative in East Timor, stated that ‘there are, as many have highlighted, 
social implications in having such a large number of foreigners in a relatively small 
country’.
lxiii
lxii The plan was unfortunately shelved after the death of a peacekeeper in July 
2000. Sergio Vieira de Mello also recognized the importance of this form of contestation, 
stating at the UN Security Council that ‘something is clearly not right if UNTAET can 
cost $692 million whereas the complete budget of East Timor is $59 million. Can it 
therefore come as a surprise that there is so much criticism of U.N. extravagances while 
the Timorese continue to suffer’?  
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However, representing the complexity of the dilemma of international intervention, even 
the measures trying to bridge this international-local gap tend to further exacerbate it. For 
instance, in Timor-Leste, UNTAET tried to keep in check the allowances given to local 
staff, in order to avoid the creation of two economies and the brain drain caused by the 
difference between living wages in government and in UN. As McAuley stated, ‘the UN 
[was] scared of repeating the screw-up in Cambodia, where UN drivers were getting 
more than government ministers.’lxiv Nevertheless, the difference in living conditions 
between international and local employees fuelled the resentment toward UNTAET. 
UNTAET international staff were paid on average 20-30 times more than their local staff, 
who received less than 1 per cent of the total UNTAET budget. The guidelines for the 
employment of local workers by humanitarian agencies specified that the wage range for 
a worker deemed ‘unskilled’ should be between 20-25,000 rupiah per day (approximately 
US$5-6), and UNTAET paid them between 25,000-30,000 rupiah per day (the average 
salary in Timor-Leste was around US$3 a day at that time). UNTAET’s main positions 
were reserved for internationally recruited personnel. Only support staff such as drivers, 
security guards and interpreters were recruited locally, that is before the “Timorization” 
process.lxv Furthermore, a breakdown of the UNTAET 2001 budget shows that the 2,000 
local staff working for the world organization cost approximately US$5.5 million, while 
the cost of buying bottled water for UNTAET personnel was US$4 million.lxvi Gabrielson 
noted that giving the contract of bottled water to a local bottled-water company could 
have created up to 1,000 jobs. The rehabilitation of Dili’s water system would have cost 
US$4 million and could have allowed up to 100,000 persons access to drinking water. 
Additionally, when the UN cut daily living allowances of international civilian police 
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staff to US$95 from US$110 per day in January 2001, de Mello had to face the 
contestation of two hundred UN employees, who signed a petition complaining they 
could not live on that. Jan Koller, the UN employee who was leading the movement 
against the cut, said that because of this policy, ‘a lot of staff members will now have to 
start digging into their salaries at home’, and that ‘will affect worker’s ability to take 
vacations, renovate destroyed accommodations, eat in restaurants and travel to and from 
work’.lxvii 
 
The white car syndrome: symptom of the bifurcation of the two worlds 
Perhaps the best example of this gap between the two worlds resides in the study of forms 
of locomotion used by the two “social groups.” More than anecdotal, the study of 
vehicles driven by internationals and locals help understand and picture the local 
resentment towards internationals. It is well known that vehicles are social status 
symbols, but in peace missions and especially in international administrations, they tend 
to acquire specific political references. The separation of the two “ways of life” is clear-
cut in this case. 
 
As one UNMIK official recalled as early as 1999, ‘we arrived at the outskirts of Pristina 
and navigated several traffic jams, comprising a jumbled mix of four-wheel-drive 
vehicles adorned with the emblems of the world’s various humanitarian organizations, 
and a bevy of private cars with no licence plates’.lxviii Similar accounts have been made in 
different missions. One United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) official 
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deployed in Namibia recalls how ‘scores of white vehicles – VW Golfs and Toyota four-
wheel-drive Land Cruisers – were painted with “UN” in big block letters on either side, 
while storefronts and warehouses were renovated, and prefabricated structures 
transported in and erected to provide office space. UNTAG staff filled hotels to capacity, 
and caravans and tents were installed in outlying regions’.
lxxii
lxix Similarly, in Cambodia, 
‘already by the time of Vieira de Mello’s early arrival, herds of Cambodian cyclos, or 
bicycle-powered sedan chairs, were being overwhelmed on the roads by gleaming white 
Toyota Land Cruisers belonging to UN agencies or humanitarian aid groups’.lxx Accounts 
of the ubiquitous UN trucks can also be found in Bosnia and Herzegovina: ‘for people 
living in post-war societies under international/UN mandates, the term global governance 
is not abstract. Administrative authority and nominal rule of law amid disruption and 
destruction may be experienced (or perceived) as being in the hands of those outsiders 
who reside in compounds with white cars and a particular flag’.lxxi In fact, one could 
easily agree with Ignatieff that ‘the spectacle of disgruntled locals, sitting in 
cafés, watching earnest young internationals speeding around to important meetings in 
Toyota Land Cruisers has been repeated in every nation-building experiment of the 
1990s’.  
 
Mention of the ‘white-car syndrome’ as a concept has been first referred to in 
development studies, especially by Donini. He noted in 1996 that ‘the UN is perceived as 
self-evidently wealthy yet, apparently, delivering very little on the ground. The white cars 
of the aid workers are seen by some in the same light as the black Land Cruisers of the 
commanders and drug traffickers - status symbols of the “fat cats”. The white car is 
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coming to be equated less with hand-outs and more with empty promises’.lxxiii In the 
same vein, he noted recently that  
The good news is that humanitarian values are present and resonate in all 
cultures. The bad news is that the baggage – modus operandi, management style, 
white car syndrome, personal behaviour – that comes with the assistance is a 
source of considerable tension in the relationship between “outsiders” and 
“insiders”.  At best we are seen as competent, well-meaning and sometimes 
inconsiderate. At worst, as arrogant, culturally insensitive vectors of alien 
agendas.lxxiv  
In yet another publication, Donini stated that ‘the definition of an “outsider” is, naturally, 
largely in the eye of the beholder. Foreigners in big white vehicles are outsiders par 
excellence’.lxxv 
 
If the spectacle of UN Toyota Land Cruisers “speeding around” has been commonplace 
in the 1990s, in the field of peace operation and humanitarian action altogether, nowhere 
it has conveyed more political meaning than in the case of international administrations, 
especially because local actors have expressly used this issue to associate it with the 
exogenous character of the state-building agenda promoted by the UN. It became another 
expression of the overwhelming presence of the international administration, 
emblematizing the foreign rule imposed from the outside. Thus, while believed 
‘absolutely necessary considering the state of the roads and the Kosovo winter’,lxxvi
lxxvii
 the 
use of these vehicles has been targeted as one expression of the exogenous presence 
being imposed on Kosovo and Timor-Leste. In a personal interview when he was under 
house arrest in Pristina, Albin Kurti, leader of the Vetevendosje! Movement (Self-
Determination) told me how he and his colleagues perceived the omnipresence of lavish 
white UN trucks as ‘symbolic violence’,  referring here to Bourdieu’s concept. For 
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Bourdieu, symbolic violence is the tacit almost unconscious modes of cultural or social 
domination occurring within the every-day social habits maintained over conscious 
subjects. Hence, symbolic power refers here to an aspect of most forms of power as they 
are routinely deployed in social life. ‘Symbolic violence’ specifies in theoretical terms 
the processes whereby, in all societies, order and social restraint are produced by indirect, 
cultural mechanisms rather than by direct, coercive social control.lxxviii
lxxix
lxxxi
 For in the routine 
flow of day-to-day life, power is seldom exercised as overt physical force: instead, it is 
transmuted into a symbolic force.  Hence, symbolic violence requires to be accepted as 
legitimate by the subject to reach its aim. Bourdieu calls it the process of misrecognition 
(méconnaissance): ‘the process whereby power relations are perceived not for what they 
objectively are but in a form which renders them legitimate in the eyes of the 
beholder’.lxxx In the context of Kosovo, one could argue that local actors denouncing 
what they directly refer to as ‘symbolic violence’ can clearly contribute to weaken the 
legitimacy of the international intervention, as the power relations are no longer 
‘concealed’ but overtly displayed.  
 
Kurti also consciously made a connection between the “white-car syndrome” and the 
specific conception of the territory from the outset justifying the presence of an 
international administration; it has been dubbed in an earlier article the ‘empty shell 
perspective’.lxxxii
lxxxiii
 For Kurti, ‘the jeep is a symptom. For UNMIK, Kosovo seems 
sometimes like a desert and sometimes like a jungle, where jeeps are needed’.  The 
UN acts as if Kosovo did not exist until the new foreign rulers arrived in 1999, according 
to Kurti. ‘We were discovered then’, he says, ‘like the inhabitants of the New World 
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when the Spanish suddenly arrived’. He adds: ‘It’s a Before and After Christ 
approach’.lxxxiv 
 
The Vetevendosje! Movement has specifically targeted UN vehicles in their contestation. 
For instance, the activists modified the traditional UN logo on the vehicles, adding a ‘F’ 
and a ‘D’ to UN, making it ‘FUND’, loosely meaning ‘End’ in Albanian. Always faithful 
to their theatrical practices, the movement has distributed parking tickets to UN vehicles, 
for ‘parking at the wrong spot – Kosova’ and deflated the tires of the vehicles arguing 
that: ‘people can breathe freely only when this unjust regime dies. This is why we have 
released the air from the tyres of their vehicles’.lxxxv  
 
Kurti’s route of resistance tells a lot about the legitimacy dilemma facing international 
administration. Vetevendosje! started as a movement against the occupation of Serbia in 
Kosovo in 1997. The Kosovo Action Network (KAN), as it was known at this time, 
campaigned for clarifying the fate of missing persons in Kosovo and organized  petitions 
and non-violent student protests. Albin Kurti, who was a student leader and one of the 
leaders of the movement, acquired national fame for being a political prisoner in 
Milošević’s jails. However, after 1999, the movement started to be marginalized and was 
looking for a new vocation. Quickly enough, the movement turned to oppose the ‘anti-
democratic regime of UNMIK’. The movement officially morphed in 2004. In what they 
consider the conceptual genesis of their movement, they read, in front of UNMIK 
buildings and precisely on the fifth anniversary of the Resolution 1244, a ‘Citizen’s 
Declaration’ and promised to struggle against the illegitimate regime of UNMIK. For 
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Kurti, UNMIK and Serbia are two sides of the same coin and one aspect of domination 
cannot be distinguished from the other.lxxxvi
lxxxvii
lxxxviii
 One is external (Serbia), the other is internal 
(UNMIK), but they closely resemble each other. For him, the problem was not a couple 
of rotten apples in the barrel, but was systemic. ‘Absolute power isolates from power’, 
Kurti added, loosely quoting from Hannah Arendt. Hannah Arendt exposes in The 
Origins of Totalitarism that power became the essence of political action and the center 
of political thought when it was separated from the political community which it should 
serve.  However, the contestation toward the ‘white-car syndrome’ goes beyond the 
Vetevendosje! Movement. As one NGO leader said to Lesley Abdela, deputy director for 
Democratisation in Kosovo for the OSCE Mission in Kosovo, only four months after 
NATO intervention: ‘you “internationals” are polluting our air and clogging up our roads 
with all your white vehicles. You refuse to employ us as professionals in your 
organisations. There are thousands of you’.  In Abdela’s words, these comments 
‘summed up the mood’ at this time.  
 
Similarly, in Timor-Leste the means of locomotion used by the UN has been significantly 
politicized,lxxxix making the comparison between the two international administrations 
interesting. Accounts of their ubiquitous presence are manifold, some even believed that 
the expression ‘white car syndrome’ was invented in Timor-Leste.xc McBeth notes that 
‘for some in East Timor, the contrast in resources is illustrated by the spectacle of highly 
paid UN staffers tooling around in luxury four-wheel vehicles and sipping cafe lattes in 
tree-shaded cafes’.xci Barker also reports ‘an armada of big, white four-wheel-drive 
vehicles cruises and clogs the dusty roads of Dili carrying the army of United Nations 
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soldiers, policemen and civil servants that is preparing the world's newest impoverished 
nation for independence’.
xciii
xcii This is a quantitative phenomenon, with Dodd reporting that 
‘the number of four-wheel-drive vehicles parked outside UNTAET’s Dili headquarters 
gives the impression of an off-road convention’.  Traub also asserts that ‘U.N. officials 
drive around in big, late-model Land Rovers while the Timorese walk along the cracked 
sidewalks or the decaying wharf. It is a combustible situation, and sparks are starting to 
fly’.xciv The contestation has even been adopted by the upper echelons of the Timorese 
leadership. After reports, that proved false, that UNTAET would spend US$15 million on 
the purchase of new vehicles, Gusmão threatened to boycott the important Lisbon 
donors’ conference in 2000. Gusmão told senior CNRT officials it would be immoral to 
go to Lisbon and ask for additional reconstruction aid to rebuild his shattered country if 
he was unaware of how the UN had spent previous donor funds.xcv As mentioned earlier, 
Hun Sen, the premier of Cambodia, warned Gusmão and Ramos-Horta as early as 
September 1999 of the potential consequences of an international intervention. Gusmão 
confronted this issue directly, stating publicly in 2000 that ‘we are not interested in a 
legacy of cars and laws, nor are we interested in a legacy of development plans for the 
future designed by [people] other than East Timorese (italics added)’.xcvi  
 
A final aspect of the “white-car syndrome” worthy of mention here is the driving 
behavior of UN personnel. Curt Gabrielson notes how ‘UN vehicles’ speed to be 
consistently higher than that of local cars. They frequently whiz past groups of 
pedestrians and, predictably, a number of East Timorese have been killed by UN 
trucks’.xcvii In all Pouligny’s inquiries among the local people, ‘problems of driving on 
27 
 
the roads and accidents caused by international staff generally came at the top of the list’. 
From one country to another, the same accusations were made against ‘those who place 
themselves above the law’; besides the road accidents, it was a ‘lack of respect’ that was 
emphasized most often; besides speeding, there was the recurring image of cars splashing 
mud as they went by or forcing their way through the road.xcviii However, this resentment 
will take a specific form in Kosovo and in Timor-Leste, due to the unprecedented powers 
granted to the UN and the politicization of the issue by local actors.  
 
Conclusion: new avenues for state-building 
Lessons drawn from international experiments in Kosovo and Timor-Leste have led to 
the birth of a concept inside the organization, the ‘light footprint approach’ that came to 
be associated with the work of the UN official Lakhdar Brahimi. The light footprint 
approach - a term coined during the planning of the United Nations Assistance Mission in 
Afghanistan (UNAMA) - advocates that UN activities should be limited to those that are 
appropriate to the local needs and context, and that international staff should be limited to 
the minimum required, with an effort to ensure local capacity-building, so that nationals 
can take over from the UN as soon as possible. Hence, for Malone, ‘Brahimi’s approach 
is designed in reaction to many things he did not like in East Timor and Kosovo, mainly 
the idea of the UN governing, rather than assisting local leaderships in governing’.xcix It 
does not mean the end of intervention, it rather implies a different form of exercising 
authority in a foreign setting: ‘to underscore the primacy of local over foreign concerns in 
no way means that the international partners have to accept the views of the local parties 
unconditionally and without discussion. But it does mean that arrogance is not 
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acceptable, and humility and genuine respect for the local population indispensable’.c 
Furthermore, it involves taking into account all aspects of international interventions, 
including unintended ones. 
 
As this article posited, massive international interventions, especially international 
administrations, may lead to unforeseen consequences over local state-building 
processes. It can exacerbate the exogenous nature of the international presence, leading to 
a ‘bifurcation of the two worlds’. In turn, the concept of bifurcation can be understood in 
terms of the bifurcation of the political and social spheres - the political response, namely 
direct governance, seems unfit to correctly address the social challenges of postwar state-
building – or, more generally, in terms of the bifurcation of the international and local 
worlds. In the latter depiction of the concept, the ‘bifurcation of the two worlds’ can be 
seen to be present in most international interventions – albeit the scope of this 
international-local gap will mainly depend on the authority vested in the mission and 
policies adopted by international officials. Moreover, its effects can be mitigated by 
various institutional arrangements. Ombudsman institutions for instance can be 
instrumental in assuring a certain degree of trust between the international presence and 
the local population, thus helping the mission to mitigate the effects of its presence. This 
article has also further developed the concept of ‘white car syndrome’ as one salient form 
of the ‘bifurcation of the two worlds’. In that regard, this contribution hopes to further the 
current research agenda on the critique of the liberal peace and the unintended 
consequences of statebuilding and peacebuilding missions, while at the same time 
building bridges between development studies and peace studies. 
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